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NAYI GRADUATE COMPTROLLERSHIP PROGRAM
THE SINGLE MANAGER CONCEPT: ITS DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION
By
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Unification of the Armed Forces is unequivocally interwoven
with unified supply management. The Single Manager Concept is but one
expression of that unification; it is a link in the whole chain of
developments which surround the unification movement.
It is the purpose of this paper to set down in a general way
something of the historical background which led to the Single Manager
System, something of the principles that underlie it and the elements
that make it up, and to place it in its proper perspective.
The opinions expressed herein are personal and are me&nt in no
sense to reflect official opinion of any of the Services.
The assistance of LCDR. £. M. McDonough, SC, USN and Miss M. £.
Haggart, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Library, in developing background
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On 1 May 1956 Department of Defense Directive 5160.14, was
promulgated. This regulation was closely followed on 3 May 1956 by
Department of Defense Directive 5160.11. With these directives, Single
Manager Service Assignment for Traffic Management within the United
States and Single Manager Assignment for Subsistence, there came into
being the Single Manager System for the management of common-use items
and common services in the Department of Defense.
The Single Manager concept for supply operations is but another
step in the continuing struggle between military and civilian elements
of the United States Government for control of the military supply
systems. It has been going on with varying degrees of emphasis almost
from the days of the Revolutionary War. Currently, this conflict is
centered around a proposed "fourth service", under civilian management,
which would take over all non-technical supply and non-combat service
activies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Single Manager System
is the Services' rebuttal to this proposal.
The term, Single Manager Concept, actually encompasses two
frames of reference, the "Single Manager" and "supply management". A
Single Manager is the Secretary of a military department designated by
the Secretary of Defense to be responsible for the organization and
operation of a particular Single Manager Assignment for specified

categories of common-use items or common service activities. Supply
management is the exercise of direction and control of all phases of
supply operations, including the functions of cataloging, standardization,
net requirements determination, procurement, production, inspection,
storage, distribution, disposal, transportation, maintenance, and
mobilisation planning. •*- It is in terms of these two frames of reference
that the Single Manager System will be examined.
To place the concept in its proper perspective, attention will
be focused on the historical influences directed toward the unification
of the military supply systems by forces outside the services, together
with approaches toward the same end which have been achieved through
service-wide coordination and cooperation. Likewise, the efforts of
the Department of Defense to carry out Congressional mandates will be
considered. Those Single Manager assignments already functioning will
be examined, and an effort will be made to point up some of their
accomplishments and deficiencies. Finally, consideration will be given
to the future outlook for the concept, its capabilities, its potential,
and alternative systems which might bear scrutiny.
^Department of Defense Directive 5160.12, Policies for




HISTORICAL AND EVOLUTIONARY ASPECTS LEADING 10
THE SINGLE MANAGER SYSTEM
The World War I and World V<ar II periods , - A complete review
of the forces which have been important in the development of efforts
on the part of the military to solve its supply and logistics management
problems must find its inception at least during the period of ^orld
War I.
In World War I, competitive bidding, both within the U. S. Army
and by the Army, Navy, and Allied Provisions Export Commission, had
resulted in exorbitant prices and maldistribution of food for both the
military services and the civilian population. This situation necessitated
the creation of a Food Purchase Board for the purpose of coordinating
purchases for all military subsistence.1 However, after the war, with
troops few in number and widely dispersed, the procurement of military
subsistence items had little market impact. Accordingly, centralized
direction and coordination of food procurement was abandoned.
During the periods between lorld Uars I and II, military matters,
for all practical purposes, were of little importance relatively, and
national attention, for the most part, was directed toward other problems,
principally those of the great depression.
In the late 1930' s, however, as the clouds of war began to
darken on many horizons, concentration again began to be centered on
•^University of Washington, Bureau of Business Research,
Subsistence Procurement for the Armed Forces (Washington: October 1952),
d.25

5issued all inclusive directives to the effect that Naval activities
must participate.4 However, as the market centers assumed increasingly-
greater increments of subsistence procurement for the Navy, Navy Market
Offices were established at these centers and staffed with Supply Corps
personnel.
During World War II, other areas of coordination of procurement
were effected to varying degrees. Central procurement of lumber was
expanded with the establishment of a Central Procurement Agency in the
Army Engineers Corps in 194-2. Procurement of fuel was accomplished on
a joint basis. Informal cooperation between the Army and the Navy in
the procurement of medical supplies, chemical warfare equipment, tractors,
small arms, and small arms ammunition was also accomplished.
^
Experience during World V.ar II indicated a still greater need
for some means of further coordinating military procurement. Feeling
not only that further coordination of procurement in connection with
large classes of similar material purchased by various Services and
Bureaus was needed, but also, that there was a danger that the coordination
which had been achieved might be lost after the war was over, the
Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, and the Under Secretary of the
Army, Robert F. Patterson directed a study of the subject by Captain
Lewis L. Strauss, USNR and, .Colonel William H. Draper, Jr. As a result
of the Strauss-Draper Report the Army-Navy Medical Procurement Agency
was established in 194.5. The Army and Navy also located their procurement
University of Washington, Bureau of Business research,
op. cit.
, p . 28
^Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Task Force on Procurement, pp. cit ., p.D-2

6offices for textile and clothing items in a single building in Hew York
City. By this arrangement it was hoped that the procuring officials
of the two departments would keep each other advised of their respective
actions, thereby achieving some of the advantages of unified procurement.
The Strauss-Draper studies might well be taken as the seed
from which the Single Manager System was sown. It was certainly the
first formally organised attempt to explore the possibilities of inter-
service logistic organization, and with it, the era of informal practices
ended and the era of integration began.
During the period covered by World Wars I and II a continuing
and growing recognition had developed in the military services that
advantages could be achieved by coordinated procurement of various items
of supply. Nevertheless, it is singularly significant that at no time
during this period was any serious consideration given to the coordination
of other elements of the supply system—storage, distribution, inspec-
tion, etc.. While it is true that War Department planners developed
proposals for a single or common supply service during World War II,
the performance of supply functions other than procurement remained the
exclusive province of the individual services, and the Straus 3-Draper
studies merely commented: "We believe that closer coordination in these
areas would be found entirely possible and highly desirable".
Post World War II Developments . - With the year 194-6 there
began a series of developments in the U. S. military logistic organization
which were to culminate in 1954 and 1955 with the "Single Manager" plan
for supply management practices, and the actual implementation of that
plan in the Spring of 1956 by direction of the Secretary of Defense.

7The U. S. Army In January 1946 announced its plan for "Merger".
The Army plan defined "Merger" as a combining of all U. S. military
forces in a single military department, a tightly integrated vertical
organization, with a single Chief of Staff to command and a single
military General Staff to coordinate the combat branches of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and the supporting services.
The significant part of plan "Merger" from the point of view
of this study, however, is that the first active step is taken to
implement a "Fourth Service of Supply". "Merger" defined the fourth
service as the primary supporting service for the combat branches; and
to consist of the technical services of the Army, the Air Materiel
Command of what is now the Air Force, and the technical bureaus and
the supply bureau of the Navy (to the extent these could not be absorbed
by the technical services of the Army) combined into a command similar
to the World War II Army Service Forces. It is important to note that
the Army concept of a "fourth service" envisioned military staffing
and control, whereas the present day concept of the fourth service
places emphasis on civilian staffing and control.
In May 194-6 a Navy plan defined "Unification" was promulgated.
"Unification" proposed a plan for an organization to coordinate relatively
autonomous military departments. It called for central policy coordi-
nation of procurement (including production) and the distribution
systems of the military departments under a Munitions Board. It was
this plan which was selected by the Congress as the primary basis for
the National Security Act of 1947.

8Another noteworthy event occurred in February 1947 when the
Navy initiated the "Integrated Navy Supply System". This system was,
in fact, a comprehensive plan for the accomplishment of all aspects of
supply support for the Navy. It provided for a single inventory con-
trol point for each broad category of items. The basis of the plan
lay in the definition of the "Technical - Supply Team", and the de-
lineation of the functions of the "technician" in relation to those
of "supply manager" together with the organizational scheme for
coordinating the efforts. The plan provided for restoring the Navy
policy of carrying all stocks of material under a singly-administered
system of supply centers, depots, and supply departments.
When the framework of the Single Manager System is examined
in a subsequent chapter, its similarities to the Integrated Supply
System of the Navy will come into sharp focus.
The National Security Act of 1947 and Unification. - As
personal Chief of Staff to President Roosevelt during V.orld ¥«ar II,
Admiral William D. Leahy had responsibilities for coordinating the
military efforts of the War and Navy Departments. The creation of this
position was the first step toward the unification of the Armed Services,
After the war, James Forrestall as Secretary of the Navy appointed
Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt to make a study addressed to the question
"Would unification of the War and Navy Departments under a single head
improve our national security; and, what should be the form of postwar
organization for Defense?" The Eberstadt Report actually became the
foundation on which the National Security Act of 1947 was built."
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the
Government, Business Organization of the Department of Defense «
(Washington : June 1955), Appendix B, pp. 144-145

9The first definitive action toward unification was accomplished
with the founding of the National Military Establishment in July 1947
in conformance with the provisions of the National Security Act (PL 253
»
80th Congress) . Problems of military supply management were over-
shadowed at the outset by those concerning the basic organisation and
combat missions of the Armed Forces. However, Section 202 of the 194-7
Act provided that the Secretary of Defense "take appropriate steps to
eliminate unnecessary duplication and overlapping in the fields of
procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research".
This Act also provided for the establishment of the Munitions Board,
the duties of which included:
a. To coordinate the appropriate activities within the National
Military Establishment with regard to industrial matters,
including the procurement, production, and distribution plans
of the departments and agencies comprising the Establishment}
b. To recommend assignment of procurement responsibilities among
the several military services and to plan for standardization
of specifications and for the greatest practicable allocation
of purchase authority of technical equipment and common-use
items on the basis of single procurement;
c. To make recommendations to regroup, combine, or dissolve,
existing interservice agencies operating in the fields of
procurement, production, and distribution, in such manner as
to promote efficiency and economy.
Munitions Board Studies . - To examine the feasibility of
assigning to a single department the responsibility for procurement,
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distribution, including depot, storage and issue, and maintenance of
common categories of supply, the Department of Defense charged the
Munitions Board in 1951 to initiate a series of supply system studies.
Of several categories eligible for consideration the medical and dental
category was selected initially. A significant facet of these studies
was a test now commonly referred to as the "Alameda test". In this
particular test, the Army Medical Depot, Alameda, California, assumed,
in addition to its then established mission, the logistic responsibility
for depot procurement, distribution, and depot maintenance, of medical
and dental supplies and equipment for all activities of the U. S. Navy
including shore, fleet, and overseas activities then receiving medical
supply support from the Naval Medical Supply Depot, Naval Supply Center,
Oakland, California.
In addition to its study in the medical - dental area similar
studies were also undertaken by the Board for the categories of auto-
motive supply systems and subsistence supply systems.
The "Bonner Bill" and the "O^lahoney Amendment" . - In 1951
a subcommittee of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive
Department under the chairmanship of Representative Bonner reported to
the House of Representatives that serious deficiencies in military
supply management existed, and that attempts at service cooperation
were unsatisfactory. The Committee alleged that a lack of effective
cross-servicing existed among the services and that interservice rival-
ries resulted in needless duplication and wasteful supply practices.
This led to the introduction of the "Bonner Bill" which would have
established a Fourth Service of Supply in the Department of Defense.
The bill was not passed.
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The O'Mahoney Amendment, Section 638 of the Department of
Defense Appropriations Act of 1953 > represented a compromise to the
proposed "Fourth Service of Supply" introduced by the Eonner Bill.
This amendment enjoined the Secretary of Defense to take necessary
steps to eliminate duplication and establish a practical and integrated
supply system. ? The Senate report on the O'Mahoney Amendment expressed
strong concern over this problem of integration statings 'When the
next Congress convenes the Department of Defense should present a pro-
gram
. . • which will speedily eliminate the duplications and 'historical
accidents' that recur and exist in the present system , . .".
This amendment led to the promulgation of Department of Defense
Directive £000. 8 of September 1952s setting forth basic regulations
governing the military supply system. With this directive the move-
ment toward the Single Manager Concept began to take definitive pro-
portions.
The Military Supply System Regulations. - The regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Defense in Department of Defense
Directive 4.OOO.8 set forth in considerable detail the objectives to be
pursued in the fields of procurement, commercial and industrial type
facilities, distribution, cataloging and standardisation, conservation,
utilization and disposal, transportation and traffic management, pro-
duction, personnel and training, and requirements review. Vvith respect
to distribution the regulations stated:
(a) Within each military service there shall be established and
'U. S. Congress, Defense Appropriations Act of 1953* Section 638,





maintained but one single supply and inventory control point
for each specified category of items.
(b) Stocks of common-use standard stock items will be financed
through stock funds.
(c) Integrated Supply Support for common-use standerd stock items
will be developed * In areas -within the U. S. and overseas,
supply support will be accomplished by single service assign-
ments in which one department will support all others, or
by cross-servicing in such areas in which r.upply support will
be obtained by one department from the nearest or most econom-
ical source without regard to which department controls such
source, unless
. . .
lit] will not result in net advantage
to the Department of Defense as a whole
.°
In some respects the O'Mahoney rider to the Appropriation Act
of 1953 might be labeled THE BIG STICK approach to the military supply
problem since it raised a question about the legality for the expenditure
of appropriated funds without "an integrated supply system to meet the
needs of the military departments",^ The principal difficulty, however,
was the fact that there was no universal agreement on what the word
"integrated" meant.
Department of Defense Directive 4.OOO.8 notwithstanding,
it soon became obvious that no progress was possible without a
single supply catalog system. This need resulted in the Defense
^Department of Defense directive 4000. 8, Establishment of Basic
Military Supply Syetem Regulations
. (Washington: 5 September 1952) pp.3-5
Italics mine.




Cataloging and Standardisation Act, P.L. 436, 62nd Congress. The
intention of the Act was to insure that only one distinctive combination
of letters or numerals or both would identify the same item either within
a bureau or service, between bureaus or services, or between the military
departments. It was the intention that once this latter purpose had
been accomplished that a considerably stronger integration of common-
use standard-stock items could be achieved among the military departments.
The act established the Defense Supply Management Agency (LSivIA) within
the LCD.
The next important development in the evolution of the Single
Manager Concept took place in June of 1953 when President Disenhov-er
undertook the reorganisation of the Department of Defense.
Reorganisation Plan Number 6 of 1953 transferred all functions
of the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, the Defense
Supply Management Agency, and the Office of Director of Installations
tc the. Secretary of Defense. It abclisheu t,hese boards and agencies and
provided in their place six additional Assistant Secretaries of Defense
and a General Counsel. It advanced a series of very controversial
changes in connection with the Joint Staff, and the administration of
unified commands. It provided in the case of the latter that the Secretary
of Defense would now designate a military department to serve as executive
agent for a unified command, rather than having the Joint Chiefs designate
one of their number directly to so act. *•




After the reorganisation of 1953 » Mr« Charles Thomas, then,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics, inherited the
sk of Quarrying out th« rams spelled out in DOD Directive 4000.8.
Mr* Thomas recognized immediately that everything coulu not
be accomplished at once. He felt that no satisfactory progress could
be accomplished unless each service brought its supply system to a
common high standard of performance.
In a memorandum dated 13 November 1953 Kr« Thomas established
an ad hoc committee to evaluate the Munitions Board Supply System
Studies. Assistant Secretary Thomas stated, "There is no present, or
intended, or desired plan for the establishment by direction or indirec-
tion of a Fourth Department of Supply or to divide commodity segments
among departments." Secretary Thoriias further 3tated that the following
action must be taken:
a. Financing and accounting procedures among the supply services
should be completely reviewed and brought into consonance with
each other to establish a firm basis essential to effective
and economical cross supply support.
b. The total volume of inventories should be analyzed and reviewed
by all services and reduced so far as possible In conjunction
a the assic ned missions of the respective departments.
c. T etl of one service should be utilized against the re-
quirements (demands) of other services to the extent that total
inventories can be reduced thereby in a most economical manner.
d. Transportation of supplies from distant points to points of
use should be reduced by employing assets of other services on




e. Responsiveness of supply systems to command must be maintained
in the military services to the extent they are in accordance
with legislative requirements and current DOD directives. This
responsibility and authority will be strengthened bys
(1) Interservice agreements being premised on the basis
of principal-agent relationship with the definite
assurance that the receiving service (principal) re-
quirements will be performed by the providing service
(agent) consistent with effectiveness and economy.
(2) Interservice agreements being spelled out in detail,
and specific arrangements with respect to one category
of material not being applied to any other category
in the absence of definite agreements.
^
It might be noted that the Hoover Commission in its report on
food and clothing in April 1955 refers to Mr. Thomas' memorandum as
being "in complete disregard" of DOD Directive 4,000.8 issued pursuant
to the O'Mahoney Amendment. 3
Under the policy set down by Mr. Thomas the Services made great
progress. They were able to turn to their individual problems, and
could forget, momentarily, having to contend with purported improvements
generated at high echelons. The Navy, which had already integrated its
supply system - - - such developments as one inventory control point
for each item, financial inventory accounting, prescribed stock levels,
Assistant Secretary of Defense (S&L) Memo, Policy Guidance for
Ad Hoc Committee on Supply Systems for Common-Use Items, 13 November 1953
•^Committee n the Organisation of the Executive Branch of the





stock fund financing - - - was able to go forward with programs of
fractionation, stratification, popularity storage, etc. The Army and
Air Force were able to develop stock funding and financial accounting.
Joint service excess property clearing houses were established. Arrange-
ments between the Navy and Marine Corps were accomplished toward a more
economical basis for mutual support. Local cross-servicing agreements
between services came into being, forking panels for the redistribution
of long stocks of food and clothing were functioning. A remarkable
amount of exchange of support between the services began to take shape.
During the period 1953 and 1954- the Department of Defense
shifted its approach to supply problems from one of commodities to one
of functions. Several developments took place as a result;
(a) The Munitions Board Studies were cancelled in December 1953*
(b) The Armed Services Textile and Apparel Procurement Agency
was legislated into disestablishment by the DOD Appropriations
Act of 1954.
(c) The "Alameda Test" was abandoned in 1954. as unsuccessful.
In a letter from Mr. Pike (the new Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Supply and Logistics) to Congressman Riehlman in July 1954-
the action of the Department was justified by stressing the following:
(a) That if the Munitions Board Supply System Studies had been
completed and implemented they would have created far more
diversification in organization, methods, and forms than then
existed and that such a course of action would provide a




(b) That this continued existence of the Munitions Board Supply-
Systems Study Project precluded the treatment of basic
supply problems across the board.
(c) That the fundamental difference between the new approach and
the approach exemplified in the Supply Systems Study Project
is that the commodity approach solves commodity problems
only whereas the functional approach covers all problems.
Then came the Second Hoover Commission, and with it, the Single
Manager Concept became reality.

CHATTER III
THE SIGNIFICANCE AND MEANING OP SOME MILITARY
MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND METHODS
Chapter II outlined the chronology of historical developmei&e
in the U. S. military logistic organization from the V*orld War I period
to the point wherein the studies of the Second Hoover Commission wera
promulgeted, and the implementation of the Single Manager Concept for
the management of common-use items and common services approached
actuality.
Before a detailed examination of the Tingle Manager System
as such is undertaken, some basic policies and definitions peculiar to
the functions of providing supplies and services should be inquired
into and clarified. Similarly, some of the pertinent developments in
material management which preceded Single Manager Assignments should
be scrutinized.
In the first place, supply management is defined as the
exercise of direction %nd control of all phases of supply operations,
including the functions of cataloging, standardization, net requires* nts
determination, procurement, production, inapection, storage, distribution,
disposal, transportation, maintenance and mobilization planning.
Common-use items are identified as a class or category of items,
of commercial type, generally used throughout the military and civilian
economies; common services are those readily identifiable categories of





Material is generally considered to include all items necessary
for the equipment, maintenance, operation, and supply of military activities
without distinction as to their application for administration or combat
purposes.
Administrative support provides for personnel, space, facilities,
and supplies, including the related budgeting, funding, fiscal control,
training, manpower control and utilization, personnel administration,
security administration, mobilization planning, and any other administra-
tive provisions and services, necessary to carry out Single Manager
assignments.!
Other activities peculiar to the program for military logistics
should be recognized as follows
s
(a) Single Service Procurement : procurement of supplies or services
by one military Department for one or more other Departments
.
(b) Joint Procurement : procurement of certain supplies to satisfy
the requirements of all the Departments by a jointly staffed
and financed agency within the Department of Defense.
(c) Plant Cognizance Procurement : procurement of certain supplies
from a particular plant by one military Department to satisfy
the requirements of all Departments,
(d) Interdepartmental Purchasing Agreements : voluntary integration
of procurement among the Services.
(e) Common-servicing : service performed by one military Department
for one or more other Departments for which no charge is made.
^Department of Defense Directive 5160.12, op. cit ., pp. 1-2
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(f) Cross-servicing * service performed by one military Department
for ona or mora othar Dapartmanta for which othar Dapartmanta
ara chargad.
(g) Joint-aervicing i earvica parformad by a jointly ataffad and
financad activity for two or mora military Dapartmanta.
2
In a study of tha Singla Managar Concapt undartakan by LCDR
D. J. Weidman, SC, USN tha author pointad out that tha Arraad Forcaa
Sacurity Act of 194-7 and tha unification movamant did not, contrary to
popular conception, bring about tha davalopmant and usa of naw principlaa
of aupply managamant, but rathar, tha iaaua actually was who should
managa matarial.
3
Likawiaa, Mr. Kobart C. Lanphier, Daputy Assistant Sacratary
of Dafansa for Supply and Logistics, in a presentation of tha Singla
Manager Plan to tha Industrial College of the Armed Forces pointed out
that the formative ideaa and enabling instructiona for improved supply
management performance had been moving constructively and consistently
forward since 1953* In short, that the path had been well developed
over carefully explored ground.*
%. S. Department of the Army, The Fourth Service of Supply and
Alternatives . (Washington: 26 September 1955) pp. 136-137
^Donald Joaeph lieidman, The Single Manager . (George Washington
Dniveraity: June, 1957) p.10
^-Assistant Secretary of Defenee for Supply and Logistics,
Single Manager System . (Viashington: 1 May 1956) pp. 3-4.
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Furthermore, it must not be construed that over the years the
Services were not making a concerted effort on their own part to improve
interservice and intraservice supply relationships. In Chapter II
reference was made to several examples of such progressive action.
Several other specific examples stand out as well.
Thirty-five categories of material were assigned to individual
military departments under single service purchase agreements. The
single service function, however, fell short of complete integration in
that the interservice function performed was limited to purchasing.
The individual departments computed their own requirements and merely
requested purchase action from the single purchasing agent. The principal
advantages realized were that material requirements could be consolidated,
industry had only one, and, was aware of, its point of contact, com-
petition for material between the services was eliminated, and responsive-
ness to command was retained. However, it must be recognized that the
single service procurement agency could not validate either the program
requirements in toto or the net requirements submitted. Similarly,
there was no control over the functions of distribution, storage, issue,
or disposal.
The Armed Services Petroleum Procurement Agency, The Armed
Services Medical Procurement Agency, and during its short-lived existence,
The Armed Services Textile and Apparel Procurement Agency are joint
procurement agencies which were established. The joint agencies differed
from the single service procurement agencies in that the joint agencies
collated the requirements of the individual departments and performed
a single act of procurement for all three departments. Beyond this
difference, the same advantages and disadvantages which prevailed with

single service procurement existed with joint agency procurement.
The "Alameda Test" provides an excellent example of a Joint-
servicing operation.
It was pointed out in Chapter II, that, under the aegis of
Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas, many excellent internal manage-
ment improvements were accomplished by the individual services. Stock
fund methods of operation, financial accounting, single inventory control
points, prescribed stock levels, and, although resisted at the outset
by the services, the Federal Supply Catalogs are examples of that
progressive action.
It was the combination of all of these developments which made
it possible to bring the Single Manager System into being, and so,
provide a workable method through which efficient and effective supply
operations could be carried out by the Armed Services with a minimum
of disruption to existing practices and with maximum use of existing
assets. At the Same time, the solution to the criticisms leveled at the
material management practices of the services by the Hoover Commission,
and, from time to time, by various committees of the Congress was found.
It was also through the implementation of the Single Manager
concept that the Services were able to circumvent the drive for a
civilian-managed supply service- a plan opposed, not only, by the military,
but also, by those military-minded individuals from outside the services
who are intimately familiar with the concepts of modern warfare. The
importance of this becomes clear when it is recognized at aitioma tic that
the functions of procurement, distribution, storage, issue, etc. are
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integral ,>arts of the military system. They are as incapable of
separation as are the functions of strategy and tactics. Accordingly,
control by any force other than military is untenable.




THE SINGLE" B1AHAGER PLAN IMPLKWLNT?-D
The Second Hoover Commission : The Congress of the U. S. under
the orovisions of Public Law 108, 83rd Congress, established the
Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,
or, as it is more commonly known, the Second Hoover Commission. The
Congress instructed this Commission to do a number of things. Those
that bear -orincipally on the subject of the Single Manager and the
Department of Defense were:
1. Reduce spending.
2. Reduce duplication and overlapping of effort.
3. Consolidate similar services and activities.
In its approach to the study of the problem the Hoover Commission
followed what might be termed "the horrible example technique" as evidenced
by the publicity given to the Mary 'a purported sixty years supply of
canned hamburger (which actually waa a special combat reserve stock that
represented an infintissircal supply when taken in its true context).
Although many of the facts developed by the Hoover Commission were twisted
and not complete, it did, however, develop a series of valid findings
that indicated the nee^ for substantial improvement in the supply manage-
ment functions of the services. The Hoover Commission was of the opinion
that improvement could be nchieved through an integrated operation - - -
assign food and clothing to "some central agency". V.'ith this philosophy
the Services were confronted with the possibility of a great galaxy of
central agencies springing up, perhaps fifty or sixty separate supply




of the Commission, seemed to ignore the recognition of the difficulties
contingent to creating a substantially different, yet manageable,
organizational pattern to improve the world-ride functions necessary
to provide supplies and servic ,
In its final renorts the Commission recommended to the Congress
that there should be a separata civilian-managed agency, reporting to
the Secretary of Defense, to administer common supply and service
activities. This agency would initially be responsible for i^uch supplies
as subsistence, clothing, medical supplies, fuels and lubricants, hardr
ware, office supplies, and automotive equipment. Civilian control was
emphasized. The Commission took no note of the fact that the officer
corps of all the services contained hundreds of extremely competent and
well educated supply administrators - - men who had spent their entire
careers preparirg for positions of great responsibility in supply
management. Furthermore, it left no doubt about the interpretation of
the terra "integrated". Nothing ragtte or indefinite was evident - - -
the answer was to take supply management away from the services, merge
it, operate it as a separate department within the Department of Defense—
The Fourth Service of Supply. Bills to implement this recommendation
were promptly introduced into the Congress.
The Single Manager Plan t As a means of forestalling the imposition
of a "Fourth Service of Supply" on the Depai'tment, the Single Manager
Plan was implemented almost immediately by the Secretary of Defense!.
This concept represented a departure from the functional approach to
supply management as practiced during the tenure of Assistant Secretary
of Defense Thomas and a return to the commodity aooroach. In essence the
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Single Manager concept is a management technique directed exprasely at
improvement in the effectiveness and economy of supply and services
activities and in precluding the possibility of duplication of effort
between and pmong the military services. Under the 'ingle Manager Plan,
when applied to a given conic odity, the r«cretary of a particular military
department is assigned responsibilities for the accomplishment of
functions of supply down through the level of wholesale distribution.
Standardisation, cataloging, net requirements determination, procurement,
inspection, inventory management, positioning, transportation, pud
maintenance, are included in these supply management assignments.
In many respects the Single Manager Plan may be contemplated
as a compromise. A compromise designed to satisfy critics in the Congress
who desired to carry out the Hoover Commission r*cof!Ei*ndations to t£»
letter; a compromise, which could find acceptance by the services without
too much resistance, in spite of grave reservations on the part of some
within the military that a situation might be created which could prove
more objectionable than th* one being corrected.
The Secretary of Defense nade eight assignments, five commodities
and three service functions as follows}
Subsistence : The Military Subsistence Supply Agency was assigned
to the U. S. Army. Implementing procedures were approved by OSD
^-Assistant Secretary of Defense of Supply and Logistics, op. pit.
,
PP.35-38
%on. John ft. McCormack, U. S. House of Hepresentativee
,
Extension of remarks on "Integration of Common Supply and Service Areas
among the Military Departments," Congressional Kecord . February 23 » 1956
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on 6 October 1956 and the assignment became fully operational for
all services on 1 July 1957.
(Tothim: and Textiles ; The Military Cjlothing and Textile Supply
Agency was also assigned to the Array* Implemented on 8 November
1956, procurement commenced on 1 January 1957, and the assignment
became fully Operational or. 1 July 1957
«
Medical Material ? The Military Medical Supply Agency was assigned
to U. S« Navy oegnlSencea OSD approved implementing procedures
in November 1956, procurement comnenced la January 1957, and
operations were fully implemented on 1 July 1957.
Petroleum , Oils and Lubricants : The I.iilitary Petroleum Supply Agency
was established effective 7 January 1957, although implementing
procedures had been approved by OSD on 21 December 1956. This
assignment became fully Operational on 1 July 1957.
Photographic Material? This assignment was made to the U.S. Air
Force, but has been placed i>n a deferred status.
Traffic Management s The Military Traffic Management Agency was
assigned on 3 May 1956 to the Army, became effective on 1 July 1956,
and fully operational on 1 July 1957.
Ocean Transportation ; The Single Manager Service Assignment for Ocean
Transportation was promulgated as of 28 May 1956. The assignment
was made to the Navy. Implementation and operation of the assignment
were almost immediate.
Air Lift Service; The Single Manager Assignment for Air Lift Service
was promulgated on 7 December 1956 and assigned to the Air Force.
Implementing details are being developed and the service is;not in
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every respect fully operational &.s a Single Manage? assignment.
Basic Principles cf the Single Manager Plan . - In concept the
Single Manager Plan is unencumbered with detail. Three main features
predominate:
1. It merges the inventory control points of the three military
services for the assigned commodity into a single control point.
2. It requires the design of an area de^ot system for wholesale
distribution and storage*
3. It utilises existing military and civilian personnel, existing
facilities, and existing organications.
In short, the concept calls for assigning wholesale supply
responsibility to one military service for itself, end the other two
services, within an organisational structure that is adaptable to
effective management
.
Organiagti o-*1 and Staffing. - It is readily understood that
prior to the specific assignment of a commodity or service a plethora
of negotiation and adjustment of differences and points of view must be
consummated. Complications at this stage are probably far greater than
the actual act of organization, for, like the- basic policies, the
organisation is simple in design. Under the *vroces< of org' nidation the
Secretary of one military department is desj red by the Secretary of
Defense as the Tingle Manager for the commodity or service in question.
The Single Manager is thus responsible for performance of all supply
management functions related to the specifier! corarcdity or service fbr
all the Ar">e'L Forces. This rc-sponsilv."!^ encompasses the entire supply
field | includinr cataloging, standardisation, requirements determination,
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procurement production, Inspection storage, distribution, transportation,
and maintenance. As indicated, the appointed Single " ; .*\ne.ger is, in each
Be, the Secretary of e military department. He retains responsibility
even though he delegates the task.
3
After the designation of the Single Manager the organisation
-es form rapidly. The new Agency is established to house the merged
inventory control points of the three services and an Executive Director
is pnpointed to administer the Agency. The Director's status is also
established within his own department* For example, when Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Charles F, Wilson established the Military Medical Supply
Agency as an activity of the Navy, the Secretary of the Navy appointed
Rer>r Admiral W. L. Knickerbocker, SC, USH as Executive Director. Further,
the status of the Executive Director was established when he was instructed
to reoort to the Single Manager through the Chief of the Bureau of
Supplies and Accounts. The Executive Director of an Agency is assigned
no other duties. As a third step the Single Manager appoints advisors
for the Executive Director. These advisors serve as an Administrative
Committee
.
At this point it might be appropriate to consider the duties
of the Executive Director's Administrative Committee. This staff is
charged with assisting the Executive Director in identifying and over-
coming problems concerning the operation of the Single Manager Assignment.
It is a group of specialists meeting for the purpose of recommending
solutions to particular nroblems and of nromotinr the effectiveness and
3lndustrial College of the Armed Forces, Publication No. L57-71,






economy with which the agency meets the needs of the military departments.
Its membership is as follows:
(a) Executive Director - Chairman.
(b) A represents tive from the Army, Navy (or Marine Corps at the
discretion of the Secretary of the Navy) , and the Air Eorce.
(c) Assistant Secretary af Defense (Comptroller) or his
reores entative
.
(d) Assistant Secretaries of Defense appropriate to the commodity
or service, or their representatives.
The Committee may be augmented by technical personnel from military
departments, as determined by the Single Manager, and as commodity or
service problems under consideration dictate. This Committee is neither
a Dolicy board nor an executive directorate.
4
with respect to staffing the agencies, tbe Executive Director
is, in every case, from the same service as the Single Manager and the
position is not expected to rotate among the services as was the case
with Joint Service Procurement Agencies. The extent to which the
agencies will be staffed below the Executive Director by military
personnel from the various services continues to remain a subject for
further study by the Department of Defense. At the present time Agencies
are staffed by officers from all the services.
Civilian personnel of the areroies are employees of that military
department which is headed by the Single Manager. In Betting up the
operating agencies, the Single Manager and his Executive Director have
been enjoined to nice optimum use of personnel now engaged in similar




work both in own department and other military departments**
Under the Single Manager system for a commodity category the
IVecutive Director sssi~.es control of the area distribution points,
which may be thr.se of any department. The determining factor in the
assumption of control over c depot of any one of the departments is its
effective geographical location with respect to all Army, Navy, and
Air Force retail establishments in that particular ares. Chart I"
exemplifies the advantares to be gained very graphically. It should
be noted that in making one system out of three, four depots will
suffice in lieu of five. The elimingtion of cross-hauls and back hauls
has reduced straight line mileage from 59,290 miles to 33,280 miles,
a reduction of US* Definite savings and improvements in service can
certainly be expected from developments such as these.
It follows that with control of the distribution points, the
storage and issue of all designated items is effected by the Single
Manager. The depot, which is designated to carry Single Manager material,
stores wholesale stocks, p.cts as agent for the Single Manager and issues
material, as required, to all services. Thus, it can haopen that the
Single Manager may have stocks positioned in depots belonging to one or
more cf the services, or perhaps, in some cases, to all of the services,
each serving activities of each of the others in any Particular area.




^Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics,
.. . oit. p,42
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Operating Procedures . - Program requirements are the foundation
on which any system of supply management is based. Gross program
requirements can only be determined by, and originate with, the requiring
services. Accordingly, under the Single Manager assignment each individual
service continues to be responsible for its individual program requirements.
A statement of these requirements is furnished to the Single Manager by
each. At this point independent service action ends. It becomes the
Single Manager's function to compute net requirements for procurement in
order that the individual service gross requirements may be satisfied.
The advantage gained here is that the Single Manager has information
available with respect to total quantities of the commodities on hand
and on order, knows what future total planned requirements exist, whether
excesses are on hand or are developing, and so, may weigh every factor
before initiating procurement action to satisfy computed net requirements.
Total requirements are procured by the Single Manager and
financed by a separate division of a single stock fund. The stock fund
is the key to the control of material, and control is inherent to owner-
ship. The Single Manager owns all wholesale stocks of his commodity,
regardless of where they are positioned. They remain under his ownership
and control from the moment of purchase until sold at the retail level.
So, in recapitulation, it is seen that the Single Manager owns
and controls the movement of wholesale stocks. However, the individual
services will actually warehouse these wholesale stocks at the request
of the Single Manager and will pay the warehousing expenses .
Corrollary with ownership and control of the wholesale stocks,
it follows that another function of the Manager will be to position his
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stocks at points as centrally located as possible to the areas of greatest
requirement and to redistribute stocks if they become imbalanced between
these distribution points. Furthermore, if excesses develop at the retail
level, it is within the purview of the Single Manager to redistribute or
rotate such stocks as conditions require, regardless of the fact that
ownership at this level is vested in the individual service.
A Single Manager operating agency is charged not only with
purchasing and distributing responsibilities, it is also responsible for
preparing and issuing catalogs and stock lists as part of the federal
Catalog program. It directs standardization programs for its commodity,
and assumes advisory status for research and development programs which
may be under study by the technical agencies which the Single Manager
serves. Other responsibilities include the functions of inspection of
new material, maintenance of material in store and the disposal of material
determined to be surplus. Finally, and of exceeding importance, is the
function of determining commodity requirements for mobilization planning.
The authority vested in the Single Manager is obviously broad
and discretionary. It covers the complete cycle from introduction of
items into the supply system all the way through to the issue function
to the consuming military service. However, it should be noted that
several functions peculiar to effective supply management are not absorbed
by the Single Manager. For example, the military departments will be
required to furnish the Single Manager the following information:
(a) Program requirements with supporting data.
(b) Mobilization requirements with supporting data.
(c) Gross consumption requirements.
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(d) Material in long supply in the retail system.
(e) Reserve stocks requiring rotation.
(f) New item requirements.
Furthermore, the military departments will be required to administer
individually the following functions as heretofore:
(a) Local inventory control procedures.
(b) Satelliting policy and procedures.




(g) Research and development.
(h) Depot operation.
(i) Management of their own activities.
At the present time, the Single Manager System is applicable only
within the continental United States. The assigned Single Managers have,
however, been requested by the Department of Defense to submit plans and
recommendations regarding extension of the plan overseas.
The Development of the Military Medical Supply Agency . - In order
that a comparison may be made of the manner in which the significant
elements of the concept, as expressed in the preceding paragraphs, have
fitted into place in actual operation a description of the Single Manager
Assignment for Medical Material, as it is presently constituted, will be
set down in limited, but significant, detail.
The Single Manager charter for medical material was issued on
U May 1956. Thi3 directive assigned the responsibility for the supply
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management of all medical material for the Armed Services to the Secretary
of the Navy, as Single Manager.
'
On 12 April 1956 the nomination of Hear Admiral W. L. Knickerbocker,
SC, USN as Executive Director was approved, and, on 26 June 1956, the
Agency was designated as an activity of the Navy under the management
control of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts and under the technical
control of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. Chart III indicates the
positioning of the Military Medical Supply Agency within the Department
of the Navy.
For medical material the Single Manager assignment meant that
the Military Medical Supply Agency now assumed the majority of the functions
previously performed by the Armed Services Medical Procurement Agency, a
joint service agency, which heretofore had the prime responsibility for
purchasing the medical requirements of the Military Services.
Within the separate distribution systems, the three services
together owned an inventory valued in excess of $320,000,000. This inven-
tory comprised about 9,500 separate items of which 85% were in common use
by all the services. Along with functions of the Armed Services Medical
Procurement Agency, the Single Manager also accepted transfer of stock
control and financial control functions from the three military stock
control offices in so far as these functions pertained to wholesale opera-
tions for the $320 million outstanding.
With respect to the details of organization, the charter of the
MMSA specified that "key military staff positions subordinate to the
"^Department of Defense Directive 5160.16, Single Manager



























Executive Director were subject to rotation on a periodic basis among
the military services as agreed to by the Single Manager and the Secretaries
of the other two military departments".® The military structure of the
organization was staffed about equally by officers of the Navy Supply
Corps and of the Medical Service Corps of the three services. The
civilian complement in the organisation is supported by the Department
of the Navy. It is significant to note that from the very implementation
of the assignment, civilian personnel requirements have declined and
ceilings have been reduced significantly without loss of effectiveness.
The MMSA Distribution System provides for primary, distribution,
and reserve stock points. Primary stock points are designed to carry
fast moving items (approximately 1500) for issue to the Army, Navy, and
Air Force activities. Historical issue experience indicated that these
1500 fast moving items would satisfy 90 per cent of anticipated customer
demand. Distribution stock points carry a full range of items and serve
to back up the primary stock points. Reserve stock points carry bulk
quantities not ordinarily required for peacetime operations, but which
are necessary to provide mobilisation reserves.
Initially, the established distribution system eliminated the
medical supply support functions of one Navy depot and one Marine Corps
activity. Subsequently, four additional reserve stock points were phased
out of operation. The distribution system has already paid dividends in
terms of savings in manpower and dollars. It has also permitted inventory
reductions without interrupting the effectiveness of the flow of medical
supplies to retail and consuming activities or reducing the Agency's
ability to provide supplies, when required. Chart IV illustrates the
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Manager assignment) liad been unsuccessful in obtain!]
money to finance aobilizati oaks, J had been unable
to take advantage of the ay Llity of each * excess stock in
spite of the f.^ct that studies had i reral million dollars
fforth of exe< ;trd . ted to satisfy mobilisation
deficiencies if thout reimbursement* The
Lementation of the assign . Medical Material iiad
the immediate effect of • . - allocation of this uco^i:
material to meet total service requij r« sement or
exchange of funds y
analysis of Chart V indicates the locus of activity for the
accomplishment of the remaining functions . -A.
Those functions most com rooedurea are vested in
the Supply and Distribution Department and require only cometarj . ^isal
as follows:
Eequi-'eiueij^'- - Receive from bhc military services on a. cyclical basis
peacetime a Nation requirements t Lth the data and
basic ptions upon 'which .sedi Direct
the periodic submissj iventory status reports of retail operating
and reserve i - total i^D requirements program for
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Procurement - Conduct or direct procurement, including contract
administration, for all centrally procured items. Designate items
to be procured locally. Furnish to the services procurement and
production data for use in requirements and supply studies. Account
for and control government-furnished material. Procure material for
the Mutual Defense Assistance Program, the Federal Civil Defense
Administration, and civilian aid programs.
Inspection - Direct inspection and quality control for medical
material with respect to procurement, storage, and maintenance of
supplies
•
Mobilisation Planning - Coordinate and direct mobilization planning.
Recommend mobilization policies and procedures to the Department of
Defense. Coordinate production schedules, potential aources of supply,
prepardness measures contracts, reserve production facilities with
industry.
Storage - Determine requirements for storage space. Request necessary
space from the owning services. Maintain records of space utilization.
Assign specific storage missions, if required.
Inventory Control - Maintain central control over medical material
inventories. Prescribe stockage objectives. Prescribe a current,
accurate, and repetitive inventory reporting system. Prescribe
requisitioning procedures. Establish prices and pricing procedures.
Direct distribution and redistribution. Coordinate the positioning
of mobilization reserve stocks. Screen all excesses. Report excesses
to the GSA.




Kesearch and Development - recommendations to the services for
research and development into unproved material* Hoke recommendations
to DOD lor program ehi nges.
Cataloging end Sfeiiroardisation - Coordinate cataloging operations.
Operate as a single, submitting activity in th< ftral Cataloj
Cystem. Develop and direct a program of standardisation and of
standards and specification maintenance.
Trensportation - arrange for required transportation or traffic
ant services from the Singli • aagers for those services.
Maintenance and Manufacture - Coordinate the operation of all military
activities engaged in maintenance , manufacture, ass Ly, or approved




Training - Establish military and civilian career
development patterns. Coordinate the execution of an adequate and
well integrated specialised training program with industry, hevieiv
training programs of the services and provide for maximum crosfc-
servicing in training.^
Objective evaluation of the Military Medical Supply agency is
still premature because; of its relatively short lived existence. The
indications are evident, however f that the MMSA is accomplishing the goal
for which it is designed; namely, to connects
(a) multiple systems for the. same items
,
(b) duplication of inventories,
Department of Defense Directive 5160. 16, op. cit . t pp. 6-11
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(c) duplication of supply pipelines, and
(d) crosp hauling of material;
because, under its cnarter, the Military Medical Supply Agency*
(a; purchases and owns all vuolesale stocks f
(b) has inventory ana issue knowledge for all items,
(c) sells stocks to the services based on consumer needs,
(d) positions material Tor optimum area support and dispersal, and
(e) determines inventory levels based on service requirements.
H
Variances between Cgja odity Agencies. - i.ven though the organ-
isational structure is basically identical for all five of the Single
Manager assignments, several important deviations developed during the
process of implementation. These differences are of significant import-
ance and should not be passed without comment*
It is obvious that subsistence items and medical and dental items
by their very nature are truly cowaon-use items. The field 01 clothing
and textiles, at first consideration, appears to contain the same common
attributes of "common-use" as subsistence and medical. Nevertheless , in
implementing the Clothing and Textile Assignment, differences soon developed.
About yj fO(jQ line items sere considered to be applicable for clothing and
textile commodity assignment. However, of the total number of itci
designated, only a small percentage proved to be actually common within
the three services* Accordingly, many slothing items in special categories
such as development and occupational items, and certain subdivisions of
special flight clothing were exempted from Single aaj «r as. at and
control.
"Bear Admiral I . L« Knickerbocker, SC, DSM, Presentation to
the Appropriation Cp£ff<ittcex Uoufie of Rejaresen;bgti Z£S, (Unpublishee %
April 1937f

Differences in the Petro ft are even more pronounced.
In fact, as presently constituted, the Single Manager Assignment for
Petroleun is, in the last analysis, little different from the Armed
Services Petroleum Purchasing Agency which it replaced. The Single Manager
for Petroleum owns no wholesale stocks of his commodity, nor does he
undertake stock positioning. Because he exercises no wholesale stock
ownership, and does not engage in positioning activity, there is no basis
for the coordination of mobili2ation planning for bulk reserve stocks of
petroleum. Again, because there is no wholesale managerial function,
there is no stock fund operation by the Single Manager. Another variation
exists with respect to aircraft fuel. Each military department has
authority to contract for plane refueling service where fuel is Government
furnished. Since there are few circumstances where fuel of this type is
not Government furnished, the Single Manager automatically has no control
over aircraft fuel as a commodity. These restrictions on the Single
Manager for Petroleum, therefore, for all practical purposes, reduce his
operating functions to nothing more than purchasing and elating.
As previously noted, the implementation of the Single Manager
Assignment for Photographic Material has been deferred. It is expected
that final decisions on this commodity will be reached about 1 July 1958.
Photographic material, like subsistence and medical, can be classifies
more generally as cosmoa-use in its true sense. Lven so, however, a
deviation from the norm appears to be developing for this category as well.
Preliminary estimates indicate that the photographic category may not be
sufficiently broad in scope to justify the establishment of a full-scale
Single Manager Agency. It would appear, therefore, that a significant

Vdifferenc develop in the
|
>dity area with respect
to the ver; J- structure of the .. sy itself.
The infereno be drawn from the modifications which are
developing in establish!:!, operational bases for the first commodity
agencies is that it is seemingly a simple task to designate that "supply
support will be accomplished by single manager assignment"; but, on the
other hand, the tools and organisational arrangements to do so, and insure
adequate support in time of both peace and war, must be carefully developed
and considered. That, even though the Single Lgnment concept
reflects a conscientious effort to improve supply management wherever
possible, wide spread extension of the plan .Id not be undertaken until
it is established without reservation that such extension will actually
result in truly significant improvement in that supply management.
The ^iivlo i'aanager Service jlasi;:uncirts . - The fundamental goals
sought by Single Manager service agencies differ in no way from the
fundamental goals of commodity agencies. The significant difference exists
only in that the Plan is employed for the management of common service
activity in lieu of common-use products . For common service activities
the basic pattern of Single Manager organization applies in all respects
except:
1. For common service activities the military departments furnish
their requirement* to the Single Manager, through the Executive
Director, in the mariner which he prescribes . For the purpose
of comparison it should be noted that the commodity area instruc-
tions pertaining to requirements state that responsibility for
program requirements continue with the individual services , and

.o the Single ger yit,h the pertinent a->sumij&ions
on which the ccwu;,a>/ions are b&ijeu .
The operating Tiding tne conuaon service will be financed
by a s: "in;; capital i'und whenever income and expense
To —
arc involved. '• In this instance, too, there is a comparative
situation - - working funds for service assignments versus stock
funds for commodities.
A detailed description and discussion of the operation of a
Single Manager Service Assignment is considered unnecessary. It is impor-
tant, however , that the most important objectives and responsibilities
of these agencies be annotated.
Single kana^er Service Assignment for Traffic I.«anageiaent /.ithin
the U. S . - The purposes and objectives of this assignment ares
1. To provide, the Boat effective and economical freight and passenger
transportation service for the Armed Forces from commercial
transportation companies operating within the U.
2. To eliminate duplication and overlapping of effort between and
arr.ong military departments.
. 3. ?.c assure under all conditions, efficiency and economy within
the Depai o£ Defense in the procurement, use, cost and
control cf commercial transportation services for tne movement
of freight and passengers within the U. S«
A. To develop plane to assure efficient use of commercial transpor-
tation resources in support of military missions.
5. To assure adequate practical training for military personnel in
•affic management.
*





Traffic Iwanagernent is defined as the direction, control , and
supervision of all functions incident to the effective and economical
procurement and use of freight and passenger transportation service from
commercial for-hire transportation companies (including rail, highway,
air, inland v/aterway, coastwise and intereoastal carriers). The basic
functional areas of traffic management can normally be broken down into
three major functional areas i the management functions, the cost functions
and the service functions.-*--'
Single Manager Service Assignment for Ocean Transportation . - The
Military Sea Transportation Service is directed:
1. To provide the most effective and economical ocean transportation
for the Armea Services.
2* To prevent duplication and overlapping of effort between and
Y.'ithin the military departments.
3. To apply to the mission of providing ocean transportation service
within the Department of Defense the basic pattern for all
organisations performing a multiple support mission.
In addition to its basic objectives, important among the general
functions pertinent to the Military Sea Transportation Service are the
following!
(a) Control, operate and administer government-owned vessels
assigned, and all ox,her vessels acquired for the purpose of
providing ocsan transportation service for the movement of
personnel, cargo, and mail.
^Department of Defense Directive 5160. 1^., Single folanager Service
Assignment for Traffic foanage^ent ?;ithin the U. S
.
,





(b) Provide ccear. transportation service, except that performed
by units cf the fleet, to all agencies of the Department of
Defense*
(c) Procure vessels outside the MSfS fleet and. passenger space in
commercial vesrele to meet the requirements of the Department
of Defense and other agencies of the U. S, Government as
authorized by the Secretary of Defense.
(d) Keep the Single Lnnager for Traffic Management informed as to
the availability of H8TS operated coastwj.se f.nri intercoastal
lift capacity.
(e) Prepare recommendations for the design, specifioations , and
equipment cf ocean-going, non-combatant type vessels.
(f) Provide lift capability in occordenoe with policies of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(g) Coordinate with the Ivlilitary Departments in the booking of
cargo, passengers, and mail.-^*
Single ll'tana^er Service Assignment for Airlift Service . - The
Military Air Transport Service, already functioning under a joint servicing
agreement, was designated as the Single Manager Operating Agoicy for
Airlift Service, and the Joint Service Agency, MATS, was disestablished.
The purposes and objectives of this assignment, with respect to
the military airlift mission, include the following?
1. To ensure that the approved D-Day and wartime airlift requirements
of the Department of Defense are met.
14-Department of Defense Directive 5160.10, Single Manager Service




2« In providing for ona (1) above be have due regard for the
commercial airlift available
•
3. To Integrate into a single military agency all transport aircraft
engaged in scheduled service, or aircraft whose operations are
suscejliole of scheduling; and each other transport aircraft
peoified by the Department of Defense.
4. To provide the most effective and economical airlift service to
support the Armed Forces consistent with the basic Kegulotions
for Military Supply SystemB and Policies for Implementation of
Single lianager Assignments.
5. To develop and guide the peacetime employment of airlift services
in a Banner that sill enhance the wartime airlift capability,
achieve greater flexibility and mobility of forces, and increase
logistics effectiveness and economy.
Airlift Service is defined as the performance or procurement of
air transportation and services incident thereto required for the move-
ment of persons, cargo , mail, or other goods.
ilitarv Airlift Capability is the airlift which the agency is
capable of providing for the air movement of passengers end cargo through
the use of controlled transport aircraft. *
Industrial Fund Accounting; in the Single Manager Concept. - Eoth
the MATS and MSTS organisations ?;ere directed to utilize Industrial Fund
accounting procedures in their operations. A discussion of the theory
of industrial funding is beyond the scope of this paper, but, nevertheless,
-department of Defense Directive 5160.2, Single Manager Assignment
for Airlift Service
, (Washington: 7 December 1956; » pp. 1-3

several of itfl important stl u*1 be recognised.
Tie principal purpos< of an Industrial Fund operation is to
provide a more effective means for controlling the costs of services
furnished | and -r nor* effective and flexible means for financing, budgeting,
and accounting for -the costs related to those services. Another objective
is to create a "buyer-sellev" relationship between the servicing activity
(in this case the Single Manager) and thoi- r rot' vies which utilise the
services rendered. This relationship is intended to place using agencies
in the position of critic o^ the cost and quality of the performing agency*
in consideration of relative costs of similar performance by outside
agencies. The Industrial Fund svetera is also intended to provide the
managers with the financial authority and flexibility required to procure
and use manpower, materials and other resources effectively.
As related to the Single Managers for Airlift Service and Ocean
Transportation the result achieved from this technique is that it provides
for the charging of services on the basis of actual cost of operations.
Cost factors are predetermined and charges made on the basis of tariff
rates proportionate to the service rendered. This enables ordering agencies
to budget and account on an end-product basis the same as when utilising
commercial sources and encourages improvement in program planning and
acheduling. It is designed to instill in ordering officials a greater
sense of responsibility in placing (or limiting) orders, and in balancing
the cost of services ordered against alternative or competing demands.
For the Single managers it is intended to furnish modern management tools
comparable to those utilised by efficient private enterprises engaged in
similar types of activity; to provide an incentive to improve cost control
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and cost stei the contractual relationship of the "buyer and
seller"; and t© require alert, forward -lookin 7 financial planning*
The similarity of objectives between the Industrial Fund System
and the Single Manager Concept is dear.
SyPBT^ry. - In November 1 c^53 Secretary of Defense Rllson issued
a directive vhiih inaugurated the Single Manager Concept in five commodity
areas end three service stress. The commodity areas ere: subsistence,
.medical and dental materia] , slothing - - textiles, petroleum products,
and photographic material; common service areas include? military traffic
management, airlift service and ocean transportation. Today, a functionin
Single Manager Igeney exists for all of these assignments except photo*
graphic material*
Slamltaneously with the direetives which established the first
Single Manager Assignments, Mr* Wilson issued another directive •which, in
detail, outlined the policies and guidelines which will be pertinent to
all Single Manager Assignments, now and in the future. (DOD Directive
5610.12)
Mr, Robert G. Lanphier, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Supply and Logistics, best summarised the Single Manager Concept vhen
he said, "we do not represent this as a -panacea to overcome all the problems
of supply of all tilings, but, in the fields of common-use items and
common services., it provides an easily understood and readily worl-able
system through which efficiency and effectiveness of supply raid service
operations can be enhanced to the benefit of all military services".

CHAPTER V
OPPOSITION TO THE SINGLE MANAGER PLAN AND ALTERNATIVE TECHNIQUES
FOR MATERIAL MANAGEMENT
Problems and Objections . - It oust not be presumed that the
Implementation of Single Manager assignments has proceeded without its
rocks and shoals or without objection from both the services and individuals.
Resistance to the concept has, for the most part, been generated
by divergent philosophies about the place of logistic support in military
tactics. Principal objection has been over the question of responsiveness
to command. The argument is that if a field commander cannot exercise
control over his logistics system, his ability to discharge his tactical
responsibilities is impaired. The Air Force, for instance, has alleged
that the accomplishment of its mission is endangered if it cannot control
its aviation fuel requirements - - result, modification of the basic
organisation of the Single Manager for Petroleum Products Assignment. The
Army and the Air Force made strong representations to retain control over
reserve stocks of medical supplies. Similarly, the Air Force and the Navy
opposed centralised traffic management on the ground that this function
was an inseparable part of any logistics system. The Air Force also raised
questions with respect to the MTM Agency's place in the traffic management
functions relating to commercial air transportation within the United States.
A second area of disagreement developed over the assignment of
specific categories of items within the basic commodity itself. The matter
of lack of standardisation of clothing has already been discussed. Other
examples which developed were whether such items as nylon for barrier




fact clothing items. Questions such as these do not present insurmountable
problems, but the point to be recognised is whether or not similar problems
will be compounded if the basic Single Manager concept is extended to
other standard commodity areas less susceptible to identification as
"common-use".
Problems developed over the siae of the agencies. Differences
of opinion have grown up between the services with respect to staffing,
both military and civilian. Another type of situation is centered around
a cogent argument by the Navy that it must assume control of subsistence
items at tidewater to insure effective overseas support.
Other difficulties became apparent over the designation of specific
storage depots of individual services as distribution depots for Single
Manager commodities. The principal problem area, as yet unresolved, is
the question which arises when one of the services decides, for some reason,
to disestablish a supply depot which is also a Single Manager assigned
distribution site. Consolidation of supplies into a limited number of
storage facilities is also at variance with the strategic concept of
dispersion. The theory of centralised storage and distribution must be
weighed in the light of ability to provide effective supply support in
the wake of an enemy nuclear attack.
Reservations over the results which can be achieved through the
Single Manager support format have not been confined strictly to the military,
Individual members of the Second Hoover Commission itself expressed dis-
senting opinions to many of the aspects of centralised control of supplies
and services.
•kJommission on Organisation of the executive Branch of the
Government, op. cit., pp. 97-122
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Responsible executives from industry have also pointed out to officials
within the Department of Defense that perhaps the trend toward central-
isation may be receiving overemphasis. They point out emphatically that
industrial giants in the United States like General Motors, Du Pont,
Westinghouse, etc. have achieved mobility through decentralization. These
experts do not condemn the Single Manager concept, but urge an increasingly
cautious approach before wide spread extension of the plan is undertaken.
By the same token, there is evidence that the reservations expressed by
industry executives are also recognized within the Department of Defense.
A memorandum on the subject from Secretary Wilson to the Department
Secretaries stated, "The feasibility of further extension of this manage-
ment technique will be determined later after careful study of possible
savings and the advantages and disadvantages of this type of operation,
recognizing that the primary mission is to effectively support the military
effort of the country ", 2
Before leaving the subject of objections to the Single Manager
Plan it is important to note that without exception, upon the resolution
of those disagreements which did develop, the three services have gone
forward with a well coordinated effort to make the individual assignments
iuccessful. Each of the services has done excellent work toward improving
its inventory control practices, toward bettering its procedures for ware-
housing and material handling, and toward standardization of methods and
procedures
.
Other Supply Management Techniques . - For the commodity areas
already integrated into Single Manager Assignments it is a relatively easy
^Secretary of Defense C. £• Wilson Memorandum for the Secretaries
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, Single Manager Assignments . 31 January 1956
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task to establish material requirements. With subsistence, clothing, and
medical supplies, personnel strengths are the clue. Fuel requirement
computations are also relatively simple. However, when general stores,
lumber and automotive equipment categories (also recommended for integration
by the Hoover Commission) are considered, the problems become more complex.
For material of this nature, requirements are tied in with a great variety
of programs. Some are related to specific equipments, but most have multiple
use. There is reasonable doubt that en effective Single Manager operation
will be as successful for these categories as can be done separately by
the services, assuming the availability of proper intelligence to handle
the problems of long supply of common items and to insure interservice
support of activities within particular distribution areas. Two supply
management techniques are available to supplement Single Manager assignments
for material not categorized in such programs. These are the Inventory
Management Improvement Program and the Interservice Supply Support Program.
The Inventory Management Improvement Program * - This program
undertakes to focus attention on the material management problem from the
point of view of adjustments and improvements in the forecasting of require-
ments, determination of allowances, the distribution of stocks, and management
policy and control techniques. Common to all these areas is the need for
a review of data collection, transmission, and utilisation. This facet of
supply management has not been formalized into a definitive project by
directive. It need not necessarily be carried out on an interservice basis.
It offers, rather, to the individual services, functioning independently
of each other, a means for meeting their support requirements in a flexible,
but orderly, manner in consonance with efficient and economical operation.
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Improvement in the capability to forecast requirements accurately
is the most important element in successful material management. Develop-
ment of usage data collection systems, comprehensive population-data
programs, and improvement in statistical techniques are some of the methods
by which this can be achieved.
Greater recognition must be given to the fact that consumer stock
levels, including scientifically prepared allowance lists for better
control of afloat endurance, must be considered as a phase of the distri-
bution process, and, consequently, related to stock levels at distribution
activities. The uneconomical pyramiding of low-demand insurance items
at all distribution levels should be scrutinized. Demand characteristics,
military essentiality cost data, rapid transportation media should all be
considered in this program.
•Military necessity" is no longer an overriding consideration to
all cost factors. Cost to purchase, cost to distribute, holding cost,
cost of movement, all must be weighed in logistic decision making.
Automatic data processing and fast data transmission may be the
solution to the problems of inventory control in systems made overwhelmingly
complicated by the presence of millions of items, involving tens of millions
of transactions yearly. Llectronic data processing offers probably the
only hope for obtaining current and valid inventory positions.
The foregoing are but a few of the areas upon which Inventory
Management Improvement Programs can be concentrated. Significant achieve-
ment can go far to eliminate much of the criticism that has been directed
at the military supply systems without further necessity of subjecting
these systems to radical modifications.
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The Inters ervice Supply Support Program . - This program was
launched formally about tha same time that the Single Manager Plan was put
into effect. Its foundation was a memorandum promulgated to the three
departments on the basis of a Joint Chiefs of Ftaff Agreement, dated 30
December 1955> which established the Joint Interservice Supply Support
Agreement. This agreement placed in effect an overall plan for interservice
supply support for qll commodities not covered by Single Manager assignments.
There are three elements in the program:
1. The Interservice Supply Support Committee.
2. Commodity Coordination Groups.
3« Regional Coordination Groups.
The Committee is composed of the Supply Chiefs of the three
Services and the Quartermaster General of the Marine Corps. Its function
is to coordinate and unify actions in the area of supply logistics in the
sane manner as the Joint Chiefs of Staff coordinate and unify the strategic
and tactical efforts of the individual services. The Committee likewise
appoints Commodity Coordination Groups from among the Inventory Managers
of the services to work on specific federal groups and classes of material
with a view toward insuring maximum utilization of assets, facilities, and
common services. Finally, the Committee insures service execution of
developed plans by policing end results.
Nine Commodity Coordination Groups have been assigned. These
groups review items which are suitable for interservice supply and, through
the supply demand control points, maintain an inventory cognizance as to
quantity, item, and location, for mutual interservice assistance. The
mission of these groups is very specific. They are charged to:
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1. Keep in constant touch with each other.
2. Identify items which are truly common to two or more servicea.
2. Lxchange data on these items.
4. Use each others releasable assets.
5. Inquire of other owners before initiating procurement actions.
Chart VI is illustrative of the manner in which interserviee
supply support works in action.
It is the function of the Regional Coordination Groups to study
regional support patterns and make recommendations for establishing support
channels on a basis of sound logistic and management principles rather
than in accordance with service membership.
Forms Improvement . - Another significant development in the
improvement of supply management should be noted. Joint agreement between
the services in relation to supply forms resulted in a directive which
became effective on 1 July 1957 wherein fourteen approved standard forms
eliminated fifty-two forma used by headquarters echelons plus several
hundred other forms used at lower echelons. Standardization of forms will
contribute greatly to the intelligence between departments and between
lesser elements throughout the supply systems.
Summary . - Considerations such as those examined in this chapter
provide definite indication that a realistic recognition exists within
the military services of the dynamic nature of logistics in modern military
operation. They point up the realisation of the necessity for accomplishing
objectives which will assure positive coordination of the Armed Forces
supply systems. There is practical evidence that action to accomplish























































They further indicate that the Servicer are alert to the necessity for
coordination of supply effort in those commodity areas which, because of
their technical nature, or for other reasons, are not planned for inclusion
under the Single Manager Plan.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION AND A LOOK TO THE FUTURE
Evaluation . - Chang* is inherent In the order of things. Insofar
as tha forces which it is designed to support change, material management
must change. The changes necessary to achieve support requirements must
be anticipated. In this sense, material management will always present
a "problem 1* - how to change to meet the climate of the times and the actual
or anticipated requirements of forces requiring support.
Prior to the National Security Act of 1947 the Department of
Defense was non-exist oat and the Secretaries of ftar and Navy reported
directly to the President. Within these departments there were twenty-six
supply systems, seven in the Army plus an Air Technical Service Command;
the Navy had eighteen different supply systems including the Quartermaster
General of the Marine Corps.
The National Security Act of 1947 brought the Air Force into being,
and with it the Air Material Command, its supply system. Seven systems
still remained in the Army, but the Navy had reorganized its systems into
four, including the Quartermaster General, Marine Corps.
With the implementation of Reorganization Plan No. 6 in 1953, the
supply systems had retained their status quo in the Army and the Air Force,
but the Navy, through its "Integrated 11 Supply System, had reduced to a
total of three, which still included the Quartermaster General, Marine Corps.
The situation which confronted the Second Hoover Commission was,




its own concept of supply systems, each handling all items used by its
department, whether common-use or technical in nature. As already noted,
the Hoover Commission placed severe criticism on the duplication and
overlapping between the departments in the field of common-use items,
and made strong recommendations for putting the supply systems on a more
centralized foundation. Other criticisms leveled at the systems were:
1. They were alleged to be contrary to law (O'Mahoney Amendment).
2. Departments jealously guard their separate autonomies.
3. They continue to expand their supply systems in common item fields.
4. In determining net requirements, the separate departments do
not make use of each others as sets.
^
Accordingly, the Single Manager Plan, founded on Department of Defense
Directive 4000.8, was established.
The intricate details surrounding the Single Manager Concept have
been presented in the foregoing chapters. One of the final questions is,
"Does the Single Manager System meet the criticisms of the Hoover Commission
Report?" With respect to making all purchases through a central agency
,
it does. In computing requirements, controlling storage, accomplishing
inspection, establishing training, end maintaining progress in standardization
of items of supply, it does. Another question is, does it meet the criti-
cisims of the Congress based upon multiple systems for the same items,
unnecessary duplication and overlapping, costly cross hauling, duplication
of pipelines, and duplication of storage facilities, particularly in
adjacent areas? It does.
'Assistant Secretary of Defense for Supply and Logistics,
op. cit., p. 34
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In the last analysis, than, tha Single Manager System has achieved
its basic objectives, but it must not be presumed that the Plan is without
disadvantages.
While there is no doubt that this technique promotes a favorable
climate for improvement in the area of requirements determination, the
present concept falls short of providing a uniform method for developing
uniform requirements determination. Similarly, as presently established,
uniform distribution procedures cannot be attained. Great progress has
been made in the centralization of these procedures vertically, but the
horizontal centralization processes have been almost entirely neglected.
The establishment of wholesale and retail levels of supply has
resulted in two management areas where one formerly existed. Accordingly,
some of the overlapping and duplication which was the subject of the
severest criticism may have merely been transposed.
Criticism has been leveled at this type of operation from the
standpoint of morale. It has been argued that assignment to duty with
another service is detrimental to an officer's career. This criticism may
be specious, although it has probably some clement of valid foundation.
Finally, the fact that Single Manager activity is limited tfo the
continental United States can be criticized from the point of view that
large inventories overseas are thus excluded from all consideration. In
many cases, such items might be of vital importance.
Significant Accomplishments . - The Single Manager Plan has been
in operation for too short a time to equate its performance to dollar
savings. Nevertheless, some of the specific improvements which have been
accomplished indicate that the overall concept is a step forward in attaining
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efficiency and effectiveness in material management. Every agency has
made important progress
.
The Military Medical Supply Agency has effected a substantial
reduction in military personnel billets, civilian personnel positions, and
has decreased requirements for office equipment and supplies as a result
of the consolidation of the functions formerly performed by the three
services individually.
Medical material formerly stored at nineteen Army, Navy, and
Air Force depots has been consolidated into fourteen wholesale stock points,
This consolidation has significantly decreased the system's pipeline
requirements. Emphasis on distribution by geographic area has eliminated
cross hauling of medical material and reduced the longer hauls necessary
prior to the Single Manager assignment.
Capitalization of the inventories of the three services has per-
mitted the application of additional assets to the services' specific
mobilization reserve requirements and has provided a better evaluation of
the overall readiness position for medical material. The pooling of these
assets has also minimized the placing of items in a "not in stock" position
and has facilitated the rotation of stocks.
The MMSA Substitution List has provided for optimum utilization
of substitute items.
Combined stock status reporting and computing of requirements
has resulted in fewer procurements, simplified procurement operations and
has eliminated the need for cross-servicing arrangements.*
^Military Medical Supply Agency, System Memoranda
.
(Brooklyn:
February 1958), pp. 2-4
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Tho Single Manager for Subsistence by utilization of the Cheatham
Annex of the Naval Supply Center, Norfolk, Virginia haa been able to
accumulate inventory levels of perishable subsistence to the point that
the use of commercial warehouses in the New lork area can shortly be
drastically reduced.
Periodic consolidated listings of issue and demand data on non-
perishable subsistence will facilitate the development of requirements
forecasts.
The agency has conducted regional meetings with representatives
of the meat industry in the United States with a view toward the improve-
ment of specification and inspection requirements and quality assurance
provisions.
In conjunction with the Military Traffic Management Agency revised
procedures have been developed with motor carriers which should reduce
administrative and evaluation workload at MSSA activities, and provide the
opportunity to realize lower freight rates.
3
Significant progress has been made in full carload procurement and
transportation in lieu of many more expensive procurement actions for LCL
shipments
•
As with the MMSA personnel savings ocoured almost instantaneously.
The Military Clothing and Textile Agency has been operational for
a much shorter period of the time than some of the other agencies. There
are indications , however, that early improvements will accrue in the area
3"Raport on Single Manager Subsistence Assignment, n Report Control
Symbol DD - S and L (TW) 5758, Period Ending 31 December 1957.
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of inventory reductions, and in the utilisation of clothing and textile
items found to be in a position of long supply*
A possible reduction in Navy enlisted men and women's clothing
items as of 1 July 1958 has been attributed to the improved procurement
methods resulting from the Single Manager System.^
In the development of its field structure the Military Traffic
Management Agency consolidated and phased out of existence sixteen
departmental field traffic offices and replaced them with five regional
and three branch offices.
The Military Sea Transportation Service has been singularly
successful in its operation almost since its inception in 19-49. Although
not formally established as a Single Manager Assignment until May 1956,
it has functioned during its entire period of existence in complete
consonance with the Single Manager theory. Operating under the Industrial
Program, it has achieved efficiency in operations, management flexibility,
and substantial dollar savings through effective cost control.
In the light of the proved success of the MSTS operation, it can
reasonably be assumed that the administrative savings already realized
in the short life span of the other Single Manager agencies will ultimately
reflect equivalent dollar savings when sufficient historical data is
accumulated to evaluate these accomplishments objectively.
4
"Wavy Garb Cost May Dip in Fiscal '59," Navy Times . March 22, 1958.
5Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Transportation,
MTMA's First Yean FI 1957 (Washington: July 1957), p.3
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Ihe Future, . - The twelve year period following the conclusion
of world fcar II has witnessed technological advances which have revolu-
tionized the basic concepts of warfare. This same technological progress
has introduced elements of strategy, tactics, and logistics almost undreamed
of in the past. Itesponsiveness of the supply support systems has become
increasingly more complex with developments such as; the current emphasis
on mobility and instantaneous retaliatory capability, the high cost of
equipments and materials, and the wide dispersal of ships and aircraft.
One of the means for satisfying these new logistic requirements is through
the Single Lan*ger Plan. Its extension is proposed for other areas:
warehousing, procurement, research and development, tidewater terminal
operations, general stores (hand tools, hardware, etc.), automotive
supplies and parts, lumber, furniture, office machines, resale merchandise,
paper and paper products are some that have been considered susceptible.
It is believed that the Single lianager system offers maximum flexibility,
but the dangers of over-centralisation must not be disregarded. Likewise,
care must be exercised that the extension of the system to other areas
does net result in another whole series of separate supply systems fraught
with all the deficiencies which the plan was designed to correct. Defense
against atomic attack is a consideration that should never be overlooked.
Perhaps decentralization of military supply operations, rather than
Increased consolidation, may prove to be the wisest course in the long
run.
The Single lianager Plan can be compared to one of the trees in
the forest. If it is a healthy tree, it will live and flourish; if it
is not healthy, it will wither and die, and other trees will come up to
-.
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take ite place. The Plan ie not a finished product; further refining
ia indicated. In concept, however, it is sound, and it is considered
that it Kill prove a valuable device for integrating the logistic oper-






DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DIRECTIVE
Subject MILITARY SUPPLY SYSTEM REGULATIONS
I. PURPOSE
The purpose of this directive is to establish basic
regulations designed to achieve an efficient and practical
operation of an integrated supply system (including
procurement, production, warehousing, and distribu-
tion of supplies and equipment, and related supply
functions) to meet the needs of the military depart-
ments, without duplicating or overlapping of either
operations or functions, in accordance with the pro-
visions of Section 638 of the Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1953.
II. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY 0* TKE REGULATIONS
On and after 8 September 1952, no officer or agency in
or under the Department of Defense shall obligate any
funds for procurement, production, warehousing, dis-
tribution of supplies or equipment or related supply
management functions, except in accordance with these
regulations and further directives issued by the Secre-
tary of Defense or an officer of his office under the
title of "Military Supply System Regulations . » (See
Section IV of this directive for method of effecting
changes in existing regulations, procedures and instruc-
tions and for interim effectiveness of existing regula-
tions, directives, procedures, and instructions until
changed.)
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING MILITARY SUPPLY SYSTEM
REGULATIONS
In order to accomplish the purpose set forth in Section I
above, the following principles are hereby established
from which deviations may be permitted only by the officers
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense charged with








Procurement will be in accordance with procedures
which include timely submission of consol-
idated requirements, the phasing of require-
ments, market analysis, phased placement of
orders, and phased delivery schedules.
2. Procurement procedures shall continue to be
improved by such considerations as : efforts to
reduce contract preparation time; maximum use of
definitive contracts; simplification and stand-
ardization of contract forma and accounting pro-
cedures within and between military departments;
improving the process of negotiations; and proper
use of formal advertising and negotiation in
the placement of contracts.
3« Purchasing shall be done on the basis of close,
accurate and definite pricing to the greatest
extent possible at the time of negotiation of
contracts, in order to reduce the necessity for
price redetermination and refunds under renego-
tiation. Price redetermination provisions shall
generally provide for downward adjustments only.
When upward price redetermination provisions are
used, a reasonable ceiling shall be included
therein and the obligation set up shall reflect
the ceiling price.
4. Price redetermination shall be conducted within
the time period specified in contracts, and con-
tracts shall be promptly modified to reflect
resulting revisions, in order to facilitate close
pricing, to provide firm price information, and
to avoid possible conflict with statutory renego-
tiation proceedings,
5. Single procurement in the form of single depart-
ment, joint agency or plant cognizance shall be
effected whenever it will result in net advan-
tages to the Department of Defense as a whole,
except in so far as it can be demonstrated that
such procurement will adversely affect military
operations. This principle will also apply to
procurement from all government-owned plants,







6. In order to eliminate unnecessary handling,
warehousing and transportation, direct deliv-
eries from suppliers to points-of-use shall
be made to the maximum extent possible, except
in those specific cases where it can be demon-
strated that there would be no net advantage
to the Department of Defense as a whole*
B. Commercial and Industrial-Type Facilities
1. Commercial and industrial-type facilities
(including, among others, warehouses, motor
repair shops, bakeries, and laundries) operated
by each of the military departments shall be
made available to the maximum extent for the
use of any of the military departments. Exist-
ing commercial and industrial-type facilities
shall be surveyed to determine the need for
their continued operation and retention. Such
facilities will not be continued in operation
where the required needs can be effectively and
economically served by existing facilities of
any department or where private commercial
facilities ?»re available, except to the extent
that such private commercial facilities are not
reasonably available or their use will be demon-
strably more expensive or except where the opera-
tion of such facilities is essential for training
purposes* Mo facilities, not in operation, shall
be retained unless necessary for mobilization
reserve* Cost accounting methods will be em-
ployed to assist in formulation of decisions
concerning cross-servicing, establishment or
continuance of such rctivities in or under the
Department of Defense*
2. Additional facilities of these types shall not
be established or acquired by a military depart-
ment unless the required needs cannot be effec-
tively served by existing facilities of all of
the departments or by private commercial facil-
ities. Except in a zone of action (e.g., Korea),
no such additional facilities shall be estab-
lished or acquired without prior approval of the
Secretary of Defense.
C. Distribution
1* Within each military service (Army, Navy,
Marine Corps and Air Force) there shall be





and inventory control point for each specified
category of items. The translation of estab-
lished stock levels into quantitative terms and
the determination of requirements will be
achieved by the appropriate supply control point
based upon information available to the. control
point, including accurate, timely and complete
reports from its purported activities.
2. As a minimum, all supply accounting at depot,
post, camp, station, base and installation
levels will be developed to achieve integra-
tion and uniformity on a quantitative and
monetary basis, except for supplies and property
with troop units and afloat, where periodic
quantitetive inventories only will be required.
(In-transit stocks, government-owned stocks in
hands of contractors or government industrial
facilities, and stocks aboard supply ships and
tenders will be considered as part of aggregate
depot, post, camp, station, base and installation
ctoeTT.
3. Stock levels shall be established and maintained
at the lowest practicable level. Such prescribed
stock levels shsHl he uniform between military
departments where similar conditions exist.
Effective controls will be established in all
areas and at all levels to insure compliance
with approved atocv levels.
lv . Within unified com!r.rndr, unified logistic
arrangements for overseas theatres will be
further devel oped
•
5. Each category of oonrron-nse standard-stock items
will be procured, warehoused, and distributed by
not more then one agency within each military
service (Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force).
(The terra •bommon-use standard-stock items" as
used in these regulations includes items simi-
lar in character used by two or ^or* depart-
ments or subdivisions thereof for the earns
or closely related purpose. Examples of such
items or categories of items are: subsistence,
medics! and dental supplies, lumber, hardware,
fuels and lubricants, household and office type
furniture and material, general housekeeping






6. Stocks of common-use standard-stock items will
be financed through Stock (revolving) Funds.
Special attention shall immediately be given
to all categories of common-uss standard-stock
items including those listed in 5 above.
7. Integrated supply support for common-use standard-
stock items will be developed. In are«s within
the united States and overseas, supply support
will be accomplished by tingle service assignment
in which one department rill support all others,
or by crosa-servicing in such areas in which supply
support will be obtained by one department from
the nearest or most economic*? source without
regard to which department controls such source,
unless it can be demonstrated that such support
will adversely affect military operations or will
not result in net advantages to the Department of




1. The cataloging and standardization programs will
be vigorously expedited in accordance with the pro-
visions of Public Law 4.36, 82nd Congress.
2. All supply items in the three military depart-
ments shall be described, identified, classified,
and numbered, in accordance with a uniform method
for all categories of material.
3. The uniform catalog data for each specified cate-
gory of jnaterial shall be utilized in all supply
operations from requirements calculation to final
disposal, by replacing existing data in accord-
ance with prescribed schedules.
4. The highest practicable degree of standardization
of items shall be achieved through the development
and use of single specifications, through the
elimination of overlapping ana duplicating item
opacifications , and through the reduction of the
number of sizes, kinds, and types of generally
similar items. Procedures shall be developed to
require the use of applicable standard specifica-
tions by all procurement agencies.
5. Duplication in the inspection of material pro-





eliminated by the coordination of inspection
organizations and by the standardisation of
inspection formats.
6. Packing, packaging, preservation and marking
procedures in the three military departments
will be made uniform, consistent with opera-
tional requirements , and wherever practicable
will parallel those used in in dustry.
7. Commercial specifications and standards, when
practical and economical, will be adopted and
integrated in the military specifications and
standard systems.
E. ponservatiop
1. The programs for renovation of economically
reparable material will have as their objectives
the maximum coordinated and timely utilization
of such resources in lieu of new procurement.
2. Supply discipline to encourage effective main-
tenance and preservation of equipment in use
will be emphasized. Issue of materials from
storage for training and garrison purposes will
be based upon maximum utilization of obsolescent
nnd limited-life materials.
3. Programs will be established to eliminate or
reduce uses of strategic and critical materials.
Mthin categories of materials, consideration
shall be given not only to relative availability
under current conditions but also under mobiliza-
tion conditions j in the establishment of specifi-
cations and standards, including the use of alter-
nate specifications and standards, less critical
material of greater coat may be specified within
reasonable price limitations.
¥• Utilization and Disposal
1. Programs will be established for thu maximum
utilization of property, including scran, which
will include continuous review of stocks to
assure they are active , to determine which
property is excess, to make maximum use of
available storage space, and to minimize main-





2. Programs for utilization or disposal of govern-
ment material and property will provide for
continous screening to make available the
excess property of any one department to meet
the needs of others. In order that adequate
information may be available t.o other depart-
ments before bulk procurement is undertaken,
an adeq\iate and practicable reporting system
will be established r;hich wil] include reports
to and from the appropriate supply control
points of the existence of ouch excesses.
3. Programs for handling scrap material will pro-
vide for the segregation e.nd identification of
strategic and critical materials.
G. Transportation and Trafjic £-:&nnf-:enent
1. The management, control, routing, negotiation,
and procurement of transportation services for
the movement of persons tad things shall be
accomplished in accordance with traffic manage-
ment policies de&igned to achieve and assure
efficient and economical traffic management.
2, Transportation activities of the military depart-
ments in both current and mobilization planning
aspects will be coordinated rith those of the
civilian economy through the appropriate agencies




1. Production programs for the military departments
shall be realistic, orderly, aid scheduled to
meet phased requirements. Such programs shall
be developed on the ba.eis of: the relative
availabilities of facilities, materials, materiel,
money and manpower j the relative availability of
each item in relation to all other items which
an essential to its employment J and the feasi-
bility of programmed rates of acquisition. Once
the approved active forces are raised *r>.c* modern-
ized and current operating stocks and mobiliza-
tion fasiMi (not in excess of those provided
in plans approved by the Secretary of Defense) are
on hard, maxlmvm feesibV re!5<*nc* wi.13 b« placed
on continuing expansible production rather than on
the accumulation of reserve stocks of end items,





procurement progMB will, te to supply to the
services the material and equipment required
for the timely accomplitihTr^nt of thai? r&sp€C-
tive missions. In doing so, procurement and
delivery of all items must be scheduled in s.
carefully planned and balanced manner to meet
the actual service needs. At all tines the
present and future productive capacity of in-
dustry must be given full consideration and
plans must, among other things, provide for the
maintenance of production lines, and wherever
possible, when computing requirements, take into
account the rnnid nxnrjisibility of these lines.
2. In computing mobilization requirements, rvA in
planning for production during mobilization,
consideration shall be given to the availability
of men, materials, materiel, and facilities (all
exoressad both in quantities tad doll era) , and
the relative availability of each item to other
items essential to its uti?JLzntion, end to the
feasible rate of acquisition.
3. No funds shall be obligated for industrial
mobilization activities except in full com-
pliance with applicable legislation (currently
Section 623, P.L. 4.34., 81st Congress, approved
October 29, 1949;
.
4. Current production programs will be integrated to
the maximum extent practicable with mobilization
plans established under the "Production Alloca-
tion Program."
5. Relative urgencies between military programs mnd
the system for determining them will be kept
under continuous review.
6. Maximum utilization will be made of reserves of
maenine tools and production equipment before
initiating procurement of such items. Machine
tools should be procured to meet the require-
ments of current production and to establish
tooled production lines with such mobilization
capacity as may be approved by the Secretary of
Defense. The highest priority is to be given
to tne requirements for current production needs,
and the second priority is to the machine tool





7. Industry shall be encouraged to expand productive
capacity through private financing.
8, Government expansion of facilities will be under-
taken only after consideration of available
capacity of privately-owned and government-owned
or operated facilities and when indicated by
^screened roobilizati.cn needs.
* • Personnel and Training
1, Within ejpch military department, s definitive
program will be established for the recruitment
and training of competent military and civilian
personnel to serve in the- areas of procurement,
production, warehousing, end distribution of
supplies and equipment, and related supplj man-
jigraent function*. Rotation, promotion, and
assignment policies vdthin each military depart-
ment will be adapted to assure the r.ost effective
use of trained personnel within these areas,
J, Requirements iieview
1. In each military department, there shall be estab-
lished and maintained, responsible direct^ to the
Secretary of the military department concerned,
office or agency charged with making an ade-
quate and thorough audit and review of require-
ments for materiel, materials ?.nd facilities,
including responsibility for monitoring I
^eloonert of the systems gnd methods for com-
puting such requirements.
K. Supply System Expansion
t
rroftibitied
1* Effective on and after September 8, 1952, until
modified by e directive issued by the ?ecret?ry
of JJefense, and regarclles c of any prior inter-
deportmentfl"! pgreements, and without the n^crssity
of any implementing directive described in
paragraph IV 1 below, no additional independent
or expanded supply facilities for common-use
tandard-fltock items of supply shfll be created
without prior approval by the Secretary of Stefan***
IV. IMPLaaMTATIOM
1« Many of the foregoing principles are wholly or partially





Secretary of Defense or by an office or agency of the
Office of the Secrutary of Defense. Such directives
shall become a part of the Military Cupply System
Regulations when certified as in conformance with these
regulations by the Secretary of Defense* or -uch
officer of his office as hi Shall designate, Cthar
principles will require implementation by new or amended
directives. Ths Secrstarj of Jtfensc will issue
instructions to the appropriate officers of his
-ffice to proceed promptly with such implementation.
2. The regulations, procedures and instructions of the
military departments will be progressively and promptly
altt-i.'t>c' to reflect the changes ttadc by each implemen-
ting directive provided for in paragraph 1 above as
follows: The Secretaries cf tee military departments
shell, as soon as may be after the issuance of each
rush directive, end in any eve ' sithin tat time speci-
fied such directive , cause regulations, proceaures
and instructions issued \.\ them or their subordinates
relevant to the portion of these regulations being im-
pler/.inted by such directive, to be revised to incor-
porate tne substance of said portion of these regula-
tion.' ch directive, end shall
promptly submit to the Secretary of Defense for
approval such revision to regulations, -procedures
and instructions (other then those relating to par-
ticular trans*, cfi ens) issued by the Lead of &ny
bureau, technical service (including for the Air
Force, Liu- Air Kateriel . ci), or equivalent or
higher suthority. After making such changes, if any,
in such revision *j thi Secretary of Defense cr his
designee may deem necessary to cause such revision to
incorporate mbstanos of these regulations as
aforesaid, the Secretary of Defense or his designee
shall rove such revision uch revision shell
become effective upon the effective date specified in
such approval] and thereupon such revisic 11 be-
come a part of the Military Supply System Regulations.
3. Except as may be otherwise provided in any implementing
directive for ll > graph 1 ^beve, nil regu-
lations, directives, procedures and instructions of
thf Office of the Seen barj of C ^n^e and of 'Ji© mil-
itary departments shall remain in full force and







4.. Each officer of the Secretary of Defense responsible
for taking action by way of implementation of theae
regulations shall maintain a record of mcjor action
talcen by him, A aimilar record will be maintained
by etch military department. Monthly progreaa re-
ports regarding the implementation of this directive
and directives nrovided for in ry.rsgraph 1 above
will be made to the Secretary of Defense by each
auch officer of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense and by the Secretary of ^*ch military de-
partment beginning 30 days from the date of thil direc-
tive. The reporting period will be changed to quar-
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